Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –)

1969

L.A. Young Sons Construction Company v. State
Tax Commission Of Utah : Brief of Defendants

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machinegenerated OCR, may contain errors.Vernon B. Romney and G. Blaine Davis; Attorneys for
Defendant
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, L.A. Young Sons Construction v. Utah Tax Comm'n, No. 11467 (1969).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2/4461

This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (1965 –) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.

-'

,

r

I

.c

~1~
~

In The Supreme Court . : >.•~
of the State of Utah,·- . ;,,_n~~·
: .

L.A.YOUNGSONSCONSTRUCTION
COMPANY,

.:;>{,'~~ . '
'-:

vs.
STATE TAX COMMISSION OF UTAH,

BRIEF OF DEF
Writ of Review to R.evieW' II&
State Tax CommBion af

·236 Sta&D . '

Salt Lab .

AttorMJI-_

CANNON, GREENE,
NEBEKER &: HORSLEY

by George J. Romney
400 Kennecott Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorneys for Plaintiff

- ·i1c'( •\

~· ;,_ ·'.

.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

page

ST ATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE

1

DISPOSITION BEFORE THE UTAH STATE TAX
COMMISSION
. _ _ _______________ _____

1

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL _----------------------------------

2

STATEMENT OF FACTS

2

ARGUMENT

3

POINT I
THE SALE OF CONSTRUCTION EQUIPMENT
BY ONE CONTRACTOR TO ANOTHER CONTRACTOR, AT AN AUCTION, IS NOT AN ISOLATED OR OCCASIONAL SALE WHEN NUMEROUS ITEMS OF EQUIPMENT ARE SOLD BY
THE SELLER TO MANY DIFFERENT PURCHASERS AT SUCH AUCTION _________________ __________

3

POINT II
THE ISOLATED OR OCCASIONAL SALE EXEMPTION CONTAINED IN SECTION 59-15-2,
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, 1953, AS AMENDED, DOES NOT APPLY TO USE TAX ON OUT
OF ST ATE PURCHASES ___________ ------------------------------

7

AUTHORITIES CITED
Genei·a Steel Co. v. State Tax Commission, 116 Utah 170
209 P.2d 208, (1949) -------------------------------- 5, 8, 9, 10, 11
Los Angeles City High School District v. State Board of
Equilization, 137 Cal. App. 2d 87, 290 P. 2d 20 ------

Marl<et Street Ry. Co. v. California State Board of Equilization, 71 Cal. App. 2d 486, 163 P.2d 45 _

7
7

TABLE OF CONTENTS (Continued)

page

Northweslcrn Pacific R.R. Co. Z'. State Board of Eq11ilization, 21 Cal. 2d 524, 13 3 P.2d 400
_ 6. 7
Pacific PijJeljnc Constrnction l'. State Board of Equilization, 429 C.2d 729, 321 P.2d 729
6, 7
Sutter Pa.eking Co. v. State Board of Equilization, 139 Cal
App. 2d 889, 295 P.2d 1083 ----------------------------------

7

Twaits Co. v. Utah State Ta_\ Commission, 106 Utah 343,
14 8 p. 2d 34 3 - ------- ---- ---- --- -- -- - ------------------ ---- --- --

10

STr\TUTES
Section 59-15-2, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 __ 3, 4, 7, 9, 12
Section 6006.5, California Revenue and Taxation Code
REGULATIONS

Utah State Tax Commission Regulation S38

4, 5' 9

OTHER AUTHORITIES

Fourth Biennial Report of the Utah State Tax Commission

12

In rfhe Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
L. A. YOUNG SONS CONSTRUCTION
COMPANY,
Plaintiff,
vs.

Case No.
11467

STATE TAX COMMISSION OF UTAH,
Defendant.

BRIEF OF DEFENDANT
ST A TEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
This is a proceding to review a determination of the Utah
State Tax Commission, which held that a deficiency use tax in
the amount of $ 5, 540.24 was properly assesed against the taxpayer, L. A. Young Sons Construction Company, a partnership, for construction equipment purchased at an auction outside the State of Utah, brought into and used in the State of
Utah.
DISPOSITION BEFORE THE UTAH STATE TAX
COMMISSION
A formal hearing on this matter was held befo:·c all nembers of the Utah State Tax Commission (hereinafter referred

2

to

,~s

i:he

Con~m;ssicn)

on October 25, 1968, and on December

4, 1968, the ComP1ission entered its unanimous decision, num-

ber 2/2, uphold;ng the deficiency assessment.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The plaintiff se~ks to h'.tve the decision of the Utah State
Tax Commission reversed.
ST K"EMENT OF FACTS
The parties to this ::i.ction have entered into a stipulation
of facts (R. 39-50) and these facts are incorporated into, ;i.rd
rest:>.':ed in the decis;on of the Commission (R. 56-60), and in
pla~ntiff's brief; however, it seems appropriate at this point to
emphasize several ::i.dditioml facts which were not stressed in
plaintiff's brief.
When plaintiff purchased the said equipment at the auction
in Wyoming, it did not purchase the entire amount of property
and equipment which w:is sold by Amis Construction Company. To the contrarv, plaintiff purchased only six out of 2 3 2
separate p:eces of equipm-o·,1t whic:h were sold at the auction in
\Vyoming on August 2 5, 1961. The 2 3 2 separate pieces of
equipment sold by Amis Consi:ruction Company, sold for a
total selling price of $789,737.50, of which the six pieces of
eq uipmrnt purchased bv pbintiff constituted $13 9, 500 of said
wm. The price for the smallest sale made was $2. 50, and the
price foi th-: l:·rge~t icc1, or group of ;terns, sole! ,,-,,s P39,500
for the sales to plaintiff. h should also be stressed that a similar sale was held by Amis Construction Company in Topeka,
Kamas on the day p:-ereding tb:: sale to the plaintiff. It should
furth.~r L~ 5tressed, that both sales were conducted and handled
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by Forkc Brnthers, an auctioneering firm which frequently
hanc11.~s simi·ar sales.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
Tl-11~ SALE OF CONSTRUCTION EQUIPMENT BY
ONE CONTRACTOR TO ANOTHER CONTRACTOR,
1\T AN AUCTION, IS NOT AN ISOLATED OR AN OCC:\2:IONJ\L SALE WHEN NUMEP,OUS ITEMS OF EQUIPMENT ARC SOLD BY TEE SEL1-ER TO MANY DIFFER1~ n I'.JRCHASERS AT SUCH AUCTION.

Plaintiff ;:illeges th1t the sale of construction equipment
que.;tion -::''?.> a 1.1 ioobtccl or occasional sale under Section 59i 5-2 (e), Ucih Code 1".nno'ated 1953, as amended, and that
bcc:iu:c of such isolated or occasional sale, said sale is exempt
from Utd1 use tax.
111

T1 e foes of this cas: clearly point out that such sale could
1

not pos:.;ibly be cons;dcred to be ";::olated or occasional". At
th.: sale of the equipment, 232 pieces of equipment were sold
by i:ht: seller, thrnush ~-n auctioneer, to m~ny d:fferent pnrch"sc:s (R. 47-50). Phnt:ff purchased only s:x of the 232 sold,
and p:iid aporoximat'."ly 17.6c;~ of the total amounts paid to the
sellc:·.

Althr1ugh pbinriff m,1y c0ntend that this merely constitut,·d one sale to plaintiff, and is thcrefcrc an ;sJ!:ited or occ~.s
iond s~k, it is de~r from the stipulated facts, that when 232
cCp:trate items arc s'Jld :tt nn oHJCtion, it l"eCjUirc:; 232 serar:1te
'ales. The aucr:aneer ;s rcC!uircd to place 232 items U? for sale,
:md is reql'ired to rcc-eive a i:op bid o:i. och cf those 232 items
and li.1mm,~:- the gavel dovm 232timcs. In add;tic:-i, rhe seller,
ihrough the S:lme auctioneer, held a similar auction just the
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day preceeding the sales in question. Although it does not appear
from the record, it is likely to assume that a similar number of
items were 5old the preceding day through the same auctioneer
for a total of over 400 separate sales in a time space of only
two days.
The provision which excludes isolated and occisional sales
from the term "retail sales", Section 59-15-2 (e), Utah (',('de
Annotated 19 5 3, as amended, is contained in the definitions
portion of the sales tax act. The relevent portions of that statute read as follows:
"The term 'retail sale' means every sale within
the State of Utah by a retailer or wholesaler by a
user or consumer, except such sales as are defined as
wholesale sales or otherwise exempted by the terms of
this act: but the term 'retail sale' is not intended to
include isolated or occasional sales by persons ;'eguarlJ' engaged in business, ... " (Emphasis added.)
Plaintiff urges that because of the above statute, and because of regulation S38 of the Utah State Tax Commission, this
sale is an isolated or occasional sJle. Regulation S3 8 of th~ State
Tax Commission at the time of the transaction involved, was
also quoted in plaintiff's brief and read as follows:
"S3 8. Isolated and occasional sales (applies to
sales and use taxes) . Isolated or occasional sales made
by persons not regularly engaged in business are not
subject to the tax. Undt>r this rule no sale is taxable
if it is not made in the -regular course of a business
of a person making retail sales as defined in regulation no. S27. The word 'business' as thus used refers
to an enterprize engaged in making retail sales not
withstanding the fart that the sales may be few or
infrequent." (Emphasis added.)

In addition, the State Tax Commission, in 1967, amended
regulation S3 8 to add the following provision:
"Sales of items at public auctions do not qualify
as exempt isolated or occasional sales."
This regulation regarding auctions was merely a declaration of the Commission's existing policy, and was not a new
pronouncement on the subject.
The State Tax Commission's interpretation of what constitntes ~m isolated or occasional sale has previously been accepted by the Court in the case of Grnez'a Steel Co. i'. State Tax
C1;111111ission, 116 Utah 170, 209 r.2d 203 ( 1949), at page 17779 of the UL1h Reports.
Although the Utah Supreme Court, in the Gc11ern Steel
case supra, held that the transfer of the entire Geneva Steel
oper:Hion was an isolated or occasional sale, they have had very
few other opportunities to determine what is an isolated or an
occasional sale.
The St::te of C?.lifornia also excludes ocosion·J ~1t.:~, :mcl
defines occa~ional sJ.les, in a statute similar to Utah's, as follows:
"A sale of property not held or used by a seller
in the course of an activity for which he is required
to hold a sellers permit, prov id rd that such sale is 110t

one of 11 serie;- of sales sufficient i11 number, scope and
characta to comtit11te a11 arli1'ity ;·equjri11g the holding of a sellers permit; ... " (Emphasis added.) Sect-

ion 6006. 5, Californina Revenue and Taxation Code.

The Supreme Court of California has had numerious occasions to interpret this provision, and some of thcise decisions
are similar to the present case.
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The most factually similar California case is the ca~c of
Pacific Pipe!ine C011strnctio1i I'. Stair Bo,m! of Equdi:::,1fio11,
321 P.2d 729, 429 C.2d 729. The facts <if that CJSe are stated
by Justice Traynor, at page 731 of the Pacific 2d Reports, as
follows:
"Plaintiff's own evidence shows that in 19 separate s:,les, in addition to the sJ'.c ;n c1ut:st:i::n, :t s~l.2
at various times from 1947 through 1950, 65 items of
equipment for a total of $41,879.22. Three sales took
place within six months preceeding the o:-ile in guestion and two in the month fol!ow:ng. The items rnlcl
from 1947 to 1950 included trucks, automobiles, fC'lerators, a compressor, a steam cleaner, cranes, tra 'le:·s,
tar pots, and dynamometer. The items sold in the ~:ile
in question included trucks, an automobile, generators,
steam cleaners,. cranes and crane attachments, trailers
and tar pots."
Justice Traynor's conclusion as to whether er not this was
an occasional s~.le was summerized as follows:
"The undisputed evidence shows that the sale 1vas
one of a series of sales sufficient in number, scope and
character . . . and was therefore not an occasional
S8Je .... "
Justice Traynor then went on to summenze the previous
California Supreme Court's similar decisions, and the terms
"number, scope, and char;icter", as follows:
"In fact, the words of the statute 'number, scope
and character' were apparently taken from this court's
opinion in Northwestern Pa.cific R.R. Co. v. Statr
Board of Equ(?lization, 21 Cal. 2d 524, 529, 133 P.2d
400. That case held that five sales of rolling ~tock over
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a three year period for about $100,000 could not be
regarded as casual 01 isob!cd sales, and that the seller
was the1efore a retailer and the tax applied. Market

Street Ry. Co. v. California State Board of Equalization, 137 Cal. App. 2d 87, 95, 290, P.2d 20, 25, in-

volved about 900 sales totalling about $100,000 during a 15 year period. Cons;dering the 'number, scope,
and character of the transfers,' the court held the
seller to be a retailer. Los Angeles City High School
District 11. State Board of Equalization, 71 Cal. App.
2d 486, 488 489, 163 P.2d 45, held that sales of buildings, improvements, and equipment not needed by the
school <listr;ct, averaging two to three sales per quarter
over a three year period were sufficient to make the
sellers retailers and subject to the tax. Moreover, Sutter
Packing Co. i·. State Board of Equalization, 139 Cal.
App. 2d 889, 895-396, 295 P.2d 1083, 1087 ... held
that a sale consumm:ited on June 1, 1949, was one of a
series and that the gross receipts therefrom must be
included in the measure of the tax although they totaled $700,000 and the gross receipts from the largest
sale since 1945 had totaled only $12,063.69." (Emphasis added.)
The po1gnmt :rnalysis by Justice Traynor is analagous to
che C8se at hand. It is respectfully submitted that the purchase
of equipment by pbintiff w;>s not an "isolated or occasional
sale" and plainriff's petition for a revers:il should be denied.
POINT II
THE ISOLATED OR OCCASIONAL SALE ~XEMP
TION CONTAINED IN SECTION 59-15-2, UTAH CODE
ANNOTATED 1953, AS AMENDED, DOES NOT APPLY
TO USE TAX ON OUT OF STA TE PURCHASES.
Plaintiff goes to great length to convince the court that
the s:tles and use tax arc ro be considered correlative and comp-
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lementary, and that the legislative created specific exemptions
from the sales tax act are to be treated as exemptions from
the use tax act. The Commission, however, does not deny that
general statement, but merely disagrees as to the application of
that general statement to the case at hand.

In Genel'a Steel Cri.

1·.

Stc:fc Tax Commis·.;0:1, s•:,':r(I, for-

mer Chief Justice Lester A. \Vade's dissent elequently points
out that all sales exempt from the sales tax act cannot be exempt from the use tax, or there would be no purpose in having a use tax act. Therefore, there must be some line drawn
between what is taxable under the sales tax act, :md what i5
taxable under the use tax act. Justice Wade stated that ;n hi'
opm10n, the exemptions from use tax should be determined :is
follows:
"The reasonable place to draw this line is, in my
opinion, to hold that where a sale, though not expressly exempted therefrom, does not come within the
scope of the sales tax act, but does come within the
scope of the use tax act and is not expressly exempted
therefrom and there is an appearent reason why such
sale should be subject to .the use tax though not subject to the sales tax, then such sale is subject to the
use tax. However, every sale which comes within the
general scope of the sales tax act but is expressly exempted from the tax where there is no appc:irent reason that such sale should be exempted from the sales
tax and not from the use tax, should also be treated
as exempted from the use tax."
The "appcarent reason" for exemption from the use tax
which Justice Wade would require is not evident in the case at
hand. The obvious reason why the sales tax act exempts "isolated
and occasional sales" from its purview, is because of the admin-
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istrative difficulty in enforcing the sales tax on sales made between individuals where the State Tax Commission can have
very little, if any, control over such sales. To attempt to impose a tax on di transactions between individuals, would be
an administrative impossibility and that is the reason the statute,~ 59-12-2 (e), Utah Code Annotated 1953, excludes only
"isolated (or) occasional sales by persons not regularly engagl'd
iii bushzess ... ." (Emphasis added.)
On the other hand, the policy for making all legislativecreated sales tax exemptions apply to the use tax, is to prevent
discrimination against out-of slate purchases. Instead, plaintiff
here urges this court to discriminate in favor of out-of-state
purchases. The legislature clearly enacted the use tax so that
out-of-state purchases could be taxed for sales on which sales
tax would have been levied if the sale had been made within
the State of Utah.
Sales at auctions within the State of Utah would have been
tax~d at the time of this transaction, are now being taxed under
the present State Tax Commission Regulation S38, and should
be taxed for auction s1les made outside the State of Utah under
the use tax provisions.
These points are adequately stressed by the reasonmg of
Justice Wade in his dissent in the Geneua Steel case, supra,
wherein he said:
"Sales of tangible personal property only when
m.ade within the state arc subject to the sales tax but
such property sold outside this state for storage use or
other consumption within this state is subject to the
use tax . . . . Only sales made by a vendor regularly
engaged in the business of selling to users or consum-
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ers and not for res:ile, are required to p::y ·ch:ct tax

. . . . (A) 11 such vendors, before making any sales,

arc requ:red to obuin :i license from Lhc next st:i:c.
Since the only me::ms of collecting the t:ix is throvgh
the vendor who is regubrly engaged in the bminess of
making such sales it i~ ,~p)nrent why only rct:iil s:dcs
and not occasional or lSolated s:iles \Vere nude suhject
to that tax. It was not bcouse the legislature intended
that occasimul er isolated sales 5hould not be subject
to the tax, but w:is merely a matter of convenience
in collecting the same.
"That reason docs not apply to the use t::u:. Property sold whether outside of or within the state for
storage, use or othet· consumption in this st2,tc is ''~' ~~
ject to that tax when it is brought within ~h:s state
and the purchaser where he did not purchase from and
pay the t'1x to a vendcr regularly engaged in b<Jsin<:ss
in this state w~s made liable to tre state for the pyment of s-wch tax i,yhe1:her the s~le was made in this
state or not and it was imm:iterial whether it was an
occasional or regul.ar sale (cites Twaits Co. v. Utah
State Tax Coll:miss'ou, lOii Utah 343, 148 P.2d .',~3::
since, where the sale v.ras made outside oi ~:he :t?,te.
t1x had to be collected from the purchaser, ic made no
difference in such case whether the sale was an isola<:ed or occasional traruction or whe<:her it w~s made to
a person regularly engaged in business, because this
state did not require a person doing business in another
state to collect this tax for it. So the convenience in
collecting this tax from a person regularly engaged
in bus:ness which existed in the c?se of the s_1le-: tax,
and w:iS the re:.:i~on for lirniting th<: t tax to a reta ;1
salts (sic) and for not coyering occ;;s;onal or isobtcd sales docs not exic.t in the case of the u~e tax."
This definitive statement by Justice W adc, although con

tained in his diEsenting opinion, is not conLrary to ?·n.y ho:din~

11
of the r,ujo1ity opinion

111

the Grne1/(I Sfrcl case, supra, but is

in~:;cative of the mmner in which the court would have applied

che b•.'' w chc facts cf 'J1is case. ln the majority opinion, writ'Cen by Just:ce \'V olfe, the sentiment of the court was clearly
expressed as follows:
"The sale of property made outside this state is
11ot subject to our sales tax, it being a sale which this
state cannot constitutionally tax. But when such property is brought into this state for storage, use or
other consumption here, thus coming to rest as an integrated part of the total property in this state, then the
use tax comes into operation and taxes, not the event
of the sale of the prcpe:ty, but the event of storage,
use or other consumption of that property within this
state.
"We hold therefore, that the storage, use or other
consumption of property, the sale of which is made in
this state and "vhich is not made amendable to the
sales tax, is likewise not subject to the use tax. Thus
it follows that isolated or occasional sales made in this
state are not subject to the operation of the use tax.

We express no opinion as to whether isolated or occ11sio1111l sales made outoide of this state are subject to our
use tax." (Emphasis 1dded) Geneva Steel Co. v. State
Tax Commission, s11 pra.

This same concept had been explained by the Utah Supreme
Court in the decision, two years earlier, in the rehearing of
U1,io11 Portla11d Cement Co. u. State Tax Commission, 110 Utah
152, 176 P.2d 879 (1947), wherein Jmtice Wolfe, at page 157
of the Utah Reports, stated as follows:
"The use tax was not intended to create a discrimination against out-of-state merchants in favor o.
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Utah merchants. Rather it was ju1SSed ... to U'llZOt'c
the theretofore existing discrimination against local
merchants in favor of out-of-state merchant~ . .
"
(Emphasis Added.)
At page 15 8 of the Utah Reports, the Court was even more
explicit when it stated:
"As before stated, the obz}ious purpose of the
Use T,1x Act was frJ impose a tax on the use i11 this
state of property thc sale of 11.!hich, because that sale
tool?_ place outsidc thc sidc, was beyond the rcach of
the Utah Sales Tax Act." (Emphasis added.)
In addition, the court approved a statement from page 3 9
of the Fourth Biennial Report of the Utah Statc Tax Commission which said:
"The (use) tax applies primarily to goods shipped
into the state in interstate commerce and to /mr.chases
made outside of the state for use within the state, and
in this manner acts as a jJrotcction and equalization
to the Utah merchant against out-of-state merchants
who may be selling to TJ!ah purchasers." (Emphasis
added.)
It should further be pointed out that the sales tax is a
transaction tax and is not levied unless there is a transaction
involving a "retail sale". On the other hand, the use tax does
not require any specific transaction, but is levied upon the
use, storage or consumption of property in the State of Utah.

In addition, this statute,§ 59-15-2 (e) Utah Code Annotated 1953, only excludes from retail sales, "isolated (or) occasional sales by persons not regularly cngaged in business . . . . "
In the case at hand, plaintiff, L. A. Young Sons Construction
Co., and the auctioneer selling the property, Forke Brothers,
are both certainly regularl-y e11 gaged in business. Therefore, that
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exclusion should not apply to this case, even if the court should
somehow decide that the above sale was an isolated or occasional sale, :md should also somehow decide that that exclusion
applies to use tax on out of state purchases.
CONCLUSION
It is respectfully submitted that because of the large number of sales ( 2 3 2) occui-ing at the auction, and because of a
similar number of sales the previous day by the same seller and
auctioneer, :rnd because both the seller and the auctioneer are
1cg11larly engaged in business, the six sales to plaintiff did not
constitute an "isolated (or) occasional sale."
It is further respectfully submitted that sales tax would
have been added to the purchase price if the sale had occurred
in Utah, and it is thei-efore within the intent of the Legislature
to t:lx such transactions. It is also vital to the economic stability of the State of Utah to avoid discrimination against Utah
merchants, c~pecially in sales of this size where the difference in
tax could well be sufficient inducement to purchase an item
in another state rather than pay the Utah Sales or Use Tax.
It is theerfore respectfully urged that the decision of the
Utah State Tax Commission be sustained.
Respectfully submitted
VERNON B. ROMNEY
Attorney General
G. BLAINE DAVIS
Assistant Attorney General
236 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorney for Defendant

